Coerced Into Confession: Prosecutorial Pressure And The Misuse Of Plea Bargaining

Despite the initial condemnation of the practice, plea bargains have become the dominant method for resolving criminal cases in the United States. The Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. United States legitimized the practice, but modern plea bargaining often prioritizes efficiency and conviction statistics over justice. Prosecutors, motivated by career advancement and institutional pressures, rely on plea deals to maintain high conviction rates, using coercive tactics such as overcharging or harsh sentencing differentials to pressure defendants into guilty pleas. Innocent defendants are particularly vulnerable to these pressures and may plead guilty to avoid the uncertainty of trial. This Note argues that excluding plea-bargained convictions from the conviction rates of prosecutors would reduce coercive practices and promote prosecutorial integrity. Doing so would realign prosecutorial incentives with the pursuit of justice, encouraging prosecutors to pursue only substantiated cases and reaffirming the constitutional right to a fair trial.