Feasibility Analysis and Impact Assessment of GOOSE Masquerading Attacks in IEC-61850 with Hardware Protection IED

The IEC-61850 substation automation framework’s generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE)protocol has many cyber vulnerabilities, including multi-cast data exchange, inadequate data encryption,no intrusion detection, and incorrect packet filtering depending on source. A realisticfeasibility study including a genuine hardware relay and attacker nodes is lacking, despite severalpropositions mitigating solutions for GOOSE manipulation attacks in power systems. Thiswork performs feasibility analysis and effect assessment of GOOSE masquerade assaults using ahardware-in-loop cyber security test bed consisting of multiple publisher and subscriber paths,including hardware IED and Raspberry PI 5 as the attacker nodes. For masquerading attacks, conflictingGOOSE instructions are injected in the shared communication from the attacker node tohardware IED/HIL simulator resulting in undesired trippings. The feasibility analysis is performedby creating multiple attack pathways with various GOOSE publisher and subscriber combinations,constraint by practical limitations, realistic assumptions and device-level intrusion detection. Foreach feasible attack scenario, a detailed impact analysis is performed to understand the operationalchallenges and stability issues. The attack emulation system includes a Typhoon HIL schematiceditor for power network simulation, real-time digital simulator for hardware integration, hardwareprotection Relay (healthy publisher) and Raspberry PI (attacker node).