Steering, Subversion, and Rights
Abstract
<div> <div> Rights protect individuals from coercion, but they do not always prevent the government from trying to influence how rights are used or from frustrating the goals people pursue through them. I use "steering" to mean noncoercive attempts to influence whether or how a right is exercised, and "subversion" to mean efforts to prevent rights holders from achieving their goals. Some rights, such as speech, religion, and voting, are mostly insulated from these tactics, while others, including procreation and property, are not. This Article asks what explains that pattern and whether it is justified. </div> <div> <br> </div> <div> I argue that governments may sometimes steer or subvert rights holders to avoid harmful uses of rights when they cannot use coercion permissibly. But steering and subversion should be barred when they rely on non‑neutral justifications, distort conscientious decision‑making, invite abuse, or undermine the values that rights protect. </div> <div> <span><br></span> </div> <div> <span>The Article develops a taxonomy of steering and subversion, explains these normative limits, and applies the framework to contested domains—government speech, partisan gerrymanders, and the rights of religious parents—to show why rights to speech, religion, and voting are insulated more often than rights to procreation, property, and guns.</span> </div> </div>
Fields of Study & Subjects
Law
Rights
and Freedoms
American Constitutional Law and Politics
Legal and Constitutional Studies
Publication details
- Journal / source
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Document type
- Preprint