The Balance of Power in Franchising

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Authors: Ulrich Atz, Blake Eliason, Michael Lipsitz, Peter Norlander, Sergio Pinto, Marshall I. Steinbaum
Cited by: 2

Abstract

We measure how the contractual balance of power between franchisors and franchisees has shifted over 2009-2024 by analyzing a large corpus of Franchise Disclosure Documents and surveying over 300 franchisees. Coding more than 20 provisions across 4,500 chains, we find that franchisee autonomy declined systematically: exclusive territories fell from a majority of chains to around 20%, while restrictions on pricing, sourcing, product offerings, and post-term competition each rose to near-universal prevalence. Franchisees appear not to have been compensated for this loss of autonomy: franchise fees rose with franchisor control, chain growth did not increase, and complaint rates to the Federal Trade Commission did not decline. We additionally find that chains that adopt franchisor-favoring provisions became 2-5 percentage points more likely to be acquired by private equity within five years. We interpret this finding as one plausible explanation for reductions in franchisee autonomy.&nbsp; <p>Vertical restraints, franchising, text analysis, survey</p>

Fields of Study & Subjects

Franchising Strategies and Performance Conflict Management and Negotiation Law Economics and Judicial Systems

Publication details

Journal / source
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Publication date
1 January 2026
Document type
Preprint