The Balance of Power in Franchising
Abstract
We measure how the contractual balance of power between franchisors and franchisees has shifted over 2009-2024 by analyzing a large corpus of Franchise Disclosure Documents and surveying over 300 franchisees. Coding more than 20 provisions across 4,500 chains, we find that franchisee autonomy declined systematically: exclusive territories fell from a majority of chains to around 20%, while restrictions on pricing, sourcing, product offerings, and post-term competition each rose to near-universal prevalence. Franchisees appear not to have been compensated for this loss of autonomy: franchise fees rose with franchisor control, chain growth did not increase, and complaint rates to the Federal Trade Commission did not decline. We additionally find that chains that adopt franchisor-favoring provisions became 2-5 percentage points more likely to be acquired by private equity within five years. We interpret this finding as one plausible explanation for reductions in franchisee autonomy. <p>Vertical restraints, franchising, text analysis, survey</p>
Fields of Study & Subjects
Franchising Strategies and Performance
Conflict Management and Negotiation
Law
Economics
and Judicial Systems
Publication details
- Journal / source
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Document type
- Preprint