Causalism: A Framework for Moral Responsibility

This essay is based on the Gaos lectures given at UNAM in March 2025. The general topic is the metaphysical underpinnings of moral responsibility, both in its basic and non-basic forms. It motivates causalism as a general framework from which to understand both forms of responsibility. It consists of two parts. The focus of the first part is basic responsibility—in particular, the metaphysical condition for that form of responsibility: free action. It motivates a causalist, compatibilist view of free action as an extension of the mainstream causalist conception of action. The focus of the second part is non-basic responsibility—responsibility for outcomes in the world. It motivates a view of the conditions under which responsibility for outcomes results from responsibility for actions, one that works as an extension of the causalist view of free action. Some highlights of the paper are the following. It provides a comprehensive, unified account of the phenomena. It highlights the role played by key metaphysical concepts (like causation, grounding, and powers) in a theory of moral responsibility. Finally, it discusses subtle methodological issues that arise when dealing with a mix of moral and metaphysical judgments.