The Impact of Ownership-Induced Entrenchment on Non-market Expenditure: The Moderating Role of Family Firm Status

This study examines the impact of ownership concentration on non-market expenditure among firms listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets, specifically investigating how this relationship is moderated by family firm status. Drawing on agency theory and the entrenchment hypothesis, the empirical findings are as follows. First, the results indicate that higher ownership concentration by controlling shareholders is significantly associated with increased levels of non-market spending. This suggests that controlling shareholders utilize non-market activities as a means of managerial entrenchment to protect their control and vested interests. Second, the positive relationship between ownership concentration and non-market spending is more pronounced in family firms compared to non-family firms. This implies that family controlling shareholders have a stronger motivation to ensure business continuity and protect family reputation, leading to a higher likelihood of misusing non-market spending as an agency cost. This research contributes to the literature by demonstrating that non-market strategies can be driven by governance flaws and private interest-seeking rather than purely value-enhancing motives. For practitioners and regulators, the findings emphasize the importance of enhanced monitoring and the need for more transparent disclosure frameworks regarding non-market expenditures in family-controlled firms with concentrated ownership.