Kant and Plato on lying

Kant?s uncompromising prohibition of lying, even when motivated by compassion or aimed at preventing harm, remains one of the most contested aspects of his moral philosophy. This paper offers a comparative analysis of Kant?s account of lying and an opposing position found in Plato, who permits deception in certain circumstances, particularly when it serves the good and when the person deceived lacks full rational agency. Although the paper is primarily devoted to an examination of Kant?s position - given its greater conceptual complexity and its grounding in central Kantian notions such as duty, the moral law, and respect for humanity - it retains a distinctly comparative aim, examining Kant?s view from the perspective of Plato?s account. I argue that, despite their disagreement over the permissibility of lying to others, Kant and Plato share a significant underlying commitment concerning the moral wrongness of inner falsehood, understood as self-deception or the corruption of one?s own self. Both regard truthfulness toward oneself as a fundamental moral requirement, even though they diverge sharply on whether deception of others can ever be justified. Finally, I argue that Kant?s strict demand not to lie is ethically and logically better grounded than is often assumed and that, when properly understood, it is not as detached from ordinary moral life as its critics suggest.