An advance (reasonable) assessment of evidence by the investigating judge as a reason of making ungrounded criminal procedural decisions during court control

The article is devoted to the problem of the false division of the assessment of evidences in criminal proceedings at the «preliminary (reasonable)» and «final». According to this concept, investigating judges, when exercising court control during the pre-trial investigation, based on a preliminary (reasonable) assessment, only make a «reasonable assessment of the complex of the evidence received» in order to determine that the person’s in the regard to the crime is probable and sufficient to notify such person of suspicion and apply a restrictive measure to him/her. And the final (full) assessment of evidences in terms of its sufficiency, reliability and admissibility is carried out only at the stage of trial. This leads to the fact that the assessment of evidence at the stage of court control is carried out formally, limitedly and superficially, as a result of which the factual circumstances are not established and ungrounded decisions are made. The position on dividing the assessment of evidence into preliminary (current) and final is unacceptable, since at any stage of the criminal process before the final decision is made, whether it is judicial control during the pre-trial investigation or trial, there is a local subject of evidence (a set of circumstances that must be established for the correct adoption of a separate (not final) procedural decision) and the standard of proof (the quantitative and qualitative component of proof, the implementation of which ensures the level of conviction necessary for making criminal procedural decisions that restrict rights and freedoms in criminal proceedings). Proving without establishing the factual circumstances of the case is impossible. The application of the standard of proof “reasonable suspicion” at the stage of choosing a preventive measure for a suspect does not relieve the investigating judge from establishing the factual circumstances of the case through an assessment of the evidence, but only imposes this obligation to a lesser extent than when passing a verdict following a trial under the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Current legislation, law enforcement practice and scientific doctrine do not provide for the possibility of carrying out a “reasonable assessment of the evidence”.