The “Honest Sign” System in Labeling Russian Light Industry Goods: The Asymmetry of Regulatory Costs

Based on a case study and chronological analysis of regulatory acts (2015‒2026), the article investigates the implementation of the “Honest Sign” system in the light industry of the Russian Federation. The hypothesis of Russian “hybrid” state corporatism has been confirmed: the state has created a monopolistic operator, “Centre for Advanced Technology Development (CATD)” LLC, through a directive process and without competitive pro-cedures. The actor analysis reveals a persistent asymmetry: fiscal efficiency has been achieved at the cost of concentrating benefits for the operator and large retailers while dissipating costs among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A comparison with European counterparts shows that decentralized models with competitive repositories achieve comparable goals without establishing a monopoly. The article introduces the concept of “regulatory concessioning”, i.e. the transfer by the state of the right to compel compliance to a private agent in exchange for a monopoly infrastructure rent, which expands the theory of neo-corporatism as applied to digital regulatory infrastructures.