Intelligence as Covert Statecraft: The OSS, CIA’s Predecessor, in Neutral Turkey, 1939-1945

During the Second World War, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operated in neutral Turkey within a wider Allied effort to monitor Axis activity, limit German access to strategic materials, and influence Ankara's wartime choices. This article examines how OSS collection, liaison, and covert action interacted with diplomacy and economic warfare between 1942 and 1945. Methodologically, it uses a qualitative historical case study that process-traces two critical episodes, the DOGWOOD network and the May 1944 Evros sabotage, and triangulates OSS files, Foreign Relations of the United States volumes, British parliamentary debates, and Turkish newspapers. The article argues that intelligence in wartime Turkey was not merely ancillary to diplomacy. Rather, it supplied decision-relevant information on German-Turkish bargaining, sharpened Allied pressure over chrome exports and transport corridors, and, in limited instances, complemented diplomatic coercion through deniable operations. Turkish officials, however, cooperated selectively and instrumentally, using liaison to preserve formal neutrality and widen Ankara's bargaining room. The findings therefore support a bounded causal claim: OSS activity did not by itself determine Turkey's late-war realignment, but it increased Allied leverage at decisive moments and formed part of a broader repertoire of wartime statecraft.