'Without Genus': Levinas's Humanism Reconsidered

Emmanuel Levinas proposed a 'humanism of the other man,' emphasizing human beings' uniquely prominent place in the universe without endorsing traditional metaphysical humanism. He rejected the idea of humanity consisting of similar individuals sharing a common, unchanging essence that would serve as the basis for a supreme value, instead focusing on individuals bound by mutual responsibility and addressability within a community. This perspective seems to distinguish Levinas's from traditional humanism, yet it poses a challenge: if the ethical relation is confined to human-to-human interactions, this implies a common human nature, potentially undermining the Other's absolute alterity. This paper argues that insisting that the I and the Other are essentially human risks negating Levinas's core idea of the Other's irreducible singularity. Consequently, it would appear that we cannot a priori exclude the possibility of an encounter with the Other that is an encounter with a being that is other than 'man.'