Metaethical implications of illusionism
Abstract
According to illusionism, there is no phenomenal consciousness, only an illusion of it. Since the phenomenal character of experience plays an important role in explaining and justifying its normative status, illusionism faces a normative problem. The problem is that illusionism, by denying phenomenal experience, potentially undermines our moral commitments. In this article, I defend the normative problem and consider solutions to it proposed by François Kammerer, Keith Frankish, Artem Besedin, Maxim Gorbachev, Artem Iunusov, and Taras Tarasenko. As I show, none of these solutions is satisfactory. I conclude by offering two alternative solutions that either weaken illusionism or accept antirealist implications for metaethics.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Omsk Scientific Bulletin Series Society History Modernity
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 84–100
- Publication date
- 4 March 2026
- Language
- EN