Research on the Moral Risks and Countermeasures of Basic Medical Insurance Coordination

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Authors: <p>Chen Xu<sup>1</sup>, Jinlong Shao<sup>1</sup>, Jiapeng Zhang<sup>2</sup></p>
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Abstract

With the gradual improvement of the basic medical insurance system, provincial pooling has become an important way to enhance the mutual assistance ability, management efficiency, and promote fairness of funds. However, this process also faces moral hazard issues caused by changes in the interests of local governments, medical insurance departments, medical institutions, and insured persons. This study systematically reviewed the manifestations, causes, and influencing factors of moral hazard through literature review and case analysis, and proposed measures to strengthen supervision and improve incentive mechanisms. The study also found that Chongqing has achieved significant results in controlling moral hazard, and its experience has important reference significance for other regions. Finally, specific policy recommendations were put forward, including steadily promoting provincial-level coordination, strengthening top-level design, paying attention to local finance, strengthening publicity and education, and establishing dynamic adjustment mechanisms, to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the medical insurance fund and the smooth implementation of provincial-level coordination reform.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Healthcare Systems and Reforms Healthcare Policy and Management Health Services Management and Policy

Publication details

Journal / source
Academic Journal of Business & Management
Volume
8
Issue
2
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN