Threading the Needle: The Logic of Conventional Coercion in Nuclear Crises

Can conventional military success lead to coercive success in a nuclear crisis? Some scholars argue that achieving limited conventional success can be used to coerce nuclear adversaries. Others argue that conventional capabilities coerce by manipulating nuclear risk. I intervene in this debate by arguing that conventional coercion in a nuclear crisis succeeds under two conditions. First, the challenger must possess an effective limited conventional option, or a conventional option that can achieve operational success while also respecting certain escalation thresholds. Second, the challenger must possess a strong nuclear retaliatory capability. Successful conventional coercion is therefore possible, but requires the challenger to thread a fine needle: It needs to restrain itself enough to avoid escalation, while also bringing enough force to bear to inflict a defeat. Achieving both aims simultaneously is difficult to do. One major implication of this argument is that US military and political leaders wanting to use conventional force effectively against a nuclear rival should work in peacetime to develop operational plans that respect geographic boundaries or refrain from targeting certain dual-use adversary platforms.