A Study on the Impact of Executive Compensation in Listed Companies on the Fulfillment of Corporate Social Responsibility

Over the past few years, the link between executive compensation in listed companies and the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a major focus in both academic circles and business practice.This paper uses Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2013-2024 period as its research sample, intending to explore the way in which executive compensation incentives affect corporate ESG performance.A multiple regression model is constructed for this study, in which variables such as return on assets (ROA), asset-liability ratio, board independence, and enterprise scale are controlled.The empirical findings reveal that executive compensation incentives exhibit a significantly positive correlation with CSR fulfillment.Specifically, when other factors remain unchanged, a one-unit rise in the level of executive compensation leads to a subsequent 0.114-unit increase in the enterprise's ESG performance.Additionally, an enterprise's size, profitability, and board of directors' independence all exert a notably positive effect on its ESG performance, while the assetliability ratio shows a marked negative effect.This study's findings lend support to the principal-agent theory: rational compensation incentives can effectively mitigate agency conflicts, align executives' interests with the enterprise's longterm development goals, and thus drive enterprises to proactively fulfill their social responsibilities.Ultimately, the present research delivers empirical backing and practical implications to enterprises aiming to optimize their strategies for corporate social responsibility (CSR) fulfillment their executive compensation structures and enhance their social responsibility governance mechanisms.