Scepticism and Argument: Sextus Empiricus on Logic. Introduction to the Special Issue

Abstract Sextus’ works against the dogmatists’ logic are among the most significant sources for logic (in the broad sense of the term which includes epistemology and philosophy of language) in the Graeco-Roman world in the period between Aristotle and Late Antiquity. They contain valuable information concerning not only the theories of non-Sceptical thinkers but also Pyrrhonist strategies of argumentation. The papers collected in this special issue take a fresh look at the evidence provided by Sextus and examine the potential of Sextus’ works to contribute to our understanding of the history of logic and theories of knowledge as well of Sextus’ argumentative strategies and what they reveal about his Pyrrhonist stance. While they do not cover every aspect of Sextus’ discussion, they aim to contribute to a better overall understanding of Sextus’ attitude to logic.