The Signaling Function of Nuclear Deterrence and Some Non-Obvious Historical Parallels

Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine has dramatically increased the demand for effective deterrents against Western countries that support Kiev. This article examines the signaling component of strategic nuclear deterrence. The author suggests that the speculative nature of nuclear strategy, and lack of practical knowledge about the dangers of nuclear escalation, can be ameliorated by analyzing the mobilization crisis of 1914 as an instance when the failure of a deterrent signal plunged the country into escalation and world war. The crisis developed rapidly and irreversibly due to the deployment of multimillion-strong armies. The author proves that the use of nuclear deterrence’s signaling function carries similar escalation risks. Understanding mobilization’s irreversibility, as established in the military theory of the 1920s, may facilitate assessment of nuclear escalation’s risks now that strategic deterrence is regaining prominence.