Chapter 5: Hybrid Threats, Cybersecurity, and Information Warfare

This paper analyses the evolution, objectives, and operational methods of Russian hybrid warfare, with particular attention to its application against Ukraine and NATO member states. Drawing on historical conceptualisations—from Evgeny Messner’s Myatezh voina to Gerasimov’s 2013 articulation of non-military pressure and information conflict—the study outlines the doctrinal foundations underpinning Russia’s contemporary use of sabotage, cyber operations, and cognitive warfare. It documents how these tools have been employed to weaken Ukraine’s defensive capacity, demoralise its population, and disrupt mobilisation by exploiting gaps in military communication and the widespread use of vulnerable information platforms such as Telegram. The paper further examines Russia’s expanding hybrid campaigns against Western partners, including sharp increases in cyberattacks, disinformation activities, and sabotage attempts across NATO states. Based on insights from a research workshop, the study identifies key challenges to countering these threats, notably the absence of shared definitions, inadequate analytical capacity, and insufficient engagement in contested online spaces. It highlights potential responses, including prioritised threat assessment, proactive information operations, and prebunking measures to build societal resilience. The paper concludes that effective mitigation requires coordinated efforts by Ukraine, NATO, and civil society.