Review of: "Free Will: Reality and Perception"

and overall assessment Krueger's manuscript is explicitly framed as a perspective paper rather than an empirical report, and it delivers exactly what that label suggests: a brisk, rhetorically con dent essay that (i) rejects libertarian free will as impossible, (ii) argues that compatibilism and pragmatism impede scienti c progress, and (iii) surveys selected ndings on how belief in free will functions psychologically and socially.The piece is readable, provocative, and pedagogically useful in places, especially where it warns against con ating moral desirability with truth.At the same time, the manuscript's scholarly contribution is limited by (a) an unusually narrow target de nition of "free will" (libertarian only), (b) a tendency to treat conceptual critiques as if they settled scienti c questions, and (c) a reliance on illustrative "toy" quantitative demonstrations and brief summaries of empirical work without enough methodological detail to evaluate the evidential weight.In short: as an opinionated synthesis aimed at correcting what the author views as conceptual confusion, the paper is competent and sometimes sharp.As a contribution to the scienti c understanding of decision-making, volition, and agency, it is underpowered: it largely bypasses mechanistic models and neuroscience, and it does not itself supply new data or a new explanatory framework that could guide discriminating experiments. What the paper actually claims (and what it does not)A central point for readers: Krueger does not remain neutral about whether free will exists.He states plainly that libertarian free will "does not, and indeed cannot, exist, " and he presents this as the rst pillar of the manuscript.