Weber vs. Niskanen? The relationship between the model of bureaucracy and the characteristics of Russian government agencies

Max Weber believed that a rational bureaucracy is free from economic interests and influences, while William Niskanen argued that high-ranking officials used their positions to maximize own utility. In our paper we assess the relationship between the type of bureaucracy and such elements of the bureau­ cracy’s production function as the number of civil servants and the level of their salaries, the number of departmental functions, and the budget expenditures. We use data for federal executive bodies for the period 2016—2018 and 2024. A methodo­logy for identifying the types of bureaucracy is proposed and tested among the heads of federal executive bodies. Their biographies are correlated with three types of bureaucracy: Weberian (career officials), professional (experts with sectoral experience), and political (party and other activists). Overall, the analyzed leaders­ are characterized by the Weberian type (with an increasing trend) and, to a lesser extent, by the political type (with a decreasing trend). The prevalence of the professional type remained at approximately 22—23% and remained virtually­ unchanged. Furthermore, we have found that the maximizing bureaucrat model is characteristic of the civil service in the Russian Federation, as budget expenditures grow even during the crisis, accompanied by an increase in the scope of government functions, the number of federal officials, and their salaries. A theoretically significant conclusion is that Weberian bureaucracy is not the opposite of Niskanen theory: bureaucracy uses professionalism to maxi­ mize own utility function. Modeling has demonstrated statistically significant effects of the bureaucrat type on the characteristics and performance of govern­ ment agencies.