Legal Epistemology and Legal Proof

This article examines the relationship between legal epistemology and legal proof. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of recent scholarship applying philosophical ideas, concepts, and arguments from epistemology to the law of evidence and the process of proving facts in legal settings. On the other hand, there has been ongoing theoretical debates about the law itself, focusing on the best understanding of the evidentiary proof process and its component parts (including the law of evidence). These are distinct, but related, theoretical projects. The article begins by spelling out a picture of legal proof in the United States. The discussion focuses on details of the evidentiary proof process that have been relatively neglected in legal epistemology. These details include the explanatory structure of the proof process; the role of the parties in the adversarial system; and how courts evaluate the sufficiency of evidence. In light of the picture of legal proof articulated, the article then examines legal epistemology by the philosopher Larry Laudan. From this discussion emerge a number of lessons for, and limitations on, applying epistemology to evidence law and legal proof. Finally, the article applies these lessons and limitations to other issues in recent legal epistemology, including: statistical evidence; the “preponderance of the evidence” standard; epistemic safety; knowledge; and epistemic injustice.