Relational Freedom: Reframing Liberty Through Feminist and Ecological Ethics of Care

This article argues that dominant liberal accounts of liberty—structured by the opposition between negative and positive freedom—presuppose an atomistic self and obscure the social and ecological conditions that make agency possible. Drawing on Carol Gilligan’s moral psychology, Joan Tronto’s political theory of care, and Val Plumwood’s ecofeminist critique of mastery, it develops a multidimensional concept of relational freedom. Freedom is reconceived as the capacity to initiate and sustain meaningful action within supportive relationships, enabling institutions, and resilient ecosystems. Gilligan shows how moral voice and agency emerge through connection; Tronto demonstrates that democratic participation depends on time, recognition, and the fair distribution of care; Plumwood reveals ecological integrity as a material condition of autonomy. Integrating these strands, the article reframes autonomy not as independence from others or from nature, but as a relational accomplishment grounded in care, justice, and ecological responsibility.