Governor as a constitutional link: An analysis of power, federalism and centre state relations in India

India’s constitutional framework reflects a unique model of governance often described as quasi-federal, where federal principles coexist with a strong centre. The study begins by explaining the nature of India’s quasi-federal structure and the historical and constitutional reasons behind the adoption of a strong centre, highlighting governor’s role as a key constitutional bridge between the union and the state. The paper further explores the constitutional meaning and position of the Governor as defined under the Constitution of India, followed by an analysis of the process of appointment, tenure, and removal. It also discusses the salaries, allowances, privileges, and immunities attached to the office, reflecting its constitutional dignity and independence. A detailed examination of the Governor’s powers is undertaken, covering executive, legislative, judicial, financial, and veto powers. In addition, the research critically engages with recent constitutional controversies surrounding the office of the Governor, especially debates concerning delays in assent to bills and the exercise of discretionary authority. Judicial developments, including the State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu case, issues relating to the use of the pocket veto, and the 2025 Presidential Reference under Article 143, are analyzed to understand evolving constitutional interpretations and their implications for cooperative federalism. The study concludes by emphasizing the need for clearer constitutional conventions, judicial guidance, and cooperative federal practices to maintain the balance between Union supremacy and state autonomy. Ultimately, the research highlights that strengthening constitutional morality and institutional accountability is essential to preserving the spirit of Indian federalism and ensuring harmonious Centre-State relations.