Mental representation without neural representation: Understanding the evidence

It is common to hear neural states and processes described in representational terms, where it is alleged that neurons function to represent stimuli, categories, motor commands and various other things. Evidence for such a role is typically based upon the ways neurons reliably respond to specific stimuli. In a recent paper, Pohl et al. (2024) have offered a more formalized account of neural representation evidence that utilizes Shannon’s information theory. Despite the ingenuity of their theory, we argue that Pohl et al. fail to present a successful account of evidence for neural representation, and indeed, repeat common mistakes that other researchers make in supporting neural representations. We offer a more in-depth and rigorous analysis of such evidence, and argue for a more skeptical conclusion: What commonly gets presented as evidence for neural representations actually isn’t. While we support the reality of cognitive representations at higher levels of analysis, we do not believe compelling evidence has been presented that supports assigning a representational role for neural states and structures.