Three Limitations of Reflective Equilibrium’s Justificatory Claims

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Authors: Anoop Kumar Suraj, C. Upendra
Cited by: 0
References: 44

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Abstract

John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (RE) offers a non-foundationalist framework for moral and political justification by harmonizing considered judgments and principles through iterative recalibration. Positioned as a response to value pluralism and normative conflict, RE foregrounds coherence and internal consistency as its epistemic ideals. On three interlinked grounds, this paper offers a critical examination of RE. First, RE’s reliance on moral intuitions can obscure the socio-historical construction of moral sensibilities. This effectively undermines the claims of universal moral justification. Second, in absence of external normative anchors, its procedural dynamism risks justificatory circularity. Third, RE assumes equal degree of epistemic accessibility to everyone that is unevenly allocated across social situations, favouring individuals possessing the cognitive, educational, and material resources required for prolonged contemplation. This asymmetry renders RE susceptible to epistemic exclusion, marginalizing subaltern moral imaginaries and reinforcing dominant normative frameworks. Consequently, RE’s epistemic architecture narrows it aspiration to pluralism.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Political Philosophy and Ethics Critical Theory and Philosophy

Publication details

Journal / source
De Ethica A Journal of Philosophical Theological and Applied Ethics
Volume
9
Issue
3
Pages
77–95
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN