Threshold Disclosure in Collective Decisions

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Authors: Luca Braghieri, Leonardo Bursztyn, Jan Fasnacht
Cited by: 0

Abstract

Voting-based collective decisions are typically made either anonymously or publicly.Anonymous voting protects truthful expression but conceals individual behavior; public voting provides information about individual votes, but, when one option is socially stigmatized, it can distort participation and choices.We introduce threshold majority voting, in which voters choose a disclosure threshold determining whether and when their votes are revealed.In an experiment at UC Berkeley on the participation of transgender women in women's sports, public voting nearly doubles abstention and reduces support for the stigmatized option.Threshold voting eliminates these distortions while revealing one-third of individual votes.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Voting Systems Electoral Systems and Political Participation Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
National Bureau of Economic Research
Publication date
1 February 2026
Language
EN