Climate policy synergy: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis of ESG compliance and tax incentives on corporate carbon governance

The effective combination of reasonable tax incentives and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) legal compliance management can significantly promote corporate carbon emission reduction and realize the goal of sustainable development. This thesis explores the impact of tax incentives on corporate carbon emission reduction in the context of ESG compliance management. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model and conducting simulation analysis, the results of the study show that through integrating ISO 37301 compliance frameworks and OECD carbon pricing benchmarks, a tax incentive gradient coupled with ESG digital compliance tools (e.g., blockchain) can accelerate strategic convergence among stakeholders. Strategic synergies among stakeholders are achieved by appropriately adjusting the income distribution coefficients and cost-sharing coefficients to optimize the allocation of resources and environmental benefits. In addition, the modeling is based on the key assumptions that each participant has limited rationality, and the constraints, such as regulatory restrictions and economic trade-offs in reality, have been considered in the model.