Optimization of decision-making and risk management strategies in second-hand ship transactions considering information asymmetry

The global shipping industry serves as a cornerstone of international trade, with the second-hand vessel market playing a vital role in capital allocation and risk redistribution. However, its operational efficiency is significantly hampered by information asymmetry. Unlike standardized newbuilds, each second-hand vessel is a unique asset whose true value hinges on “hidden attributes” such as maintenance history and accident records that remain partially inaccessible to buyers. This aligns with the characteristics of the “lemons market” theory, inducing adverse selection and diminishing market efficiency. To address this, this paper constructs an incomplete information static Bayesian game model, abstracting the transaction as a two-stage sequential game where the seller quotes first and the buyer decides subsequently. The aim is to reveal how sellers with information advantages formulate optimal quoting strategies across different vessel types and cost structures, and how buyers at an informational disadvantage develop acceptance/rejection decision rules based on posterior beliefs. Numerical methods (Newton-Raphson iteration) were employed to solve the model equilibrium, calculating equilibrium quotations, transaction probabilities, and seller expected residuals for ten major container vessel types. Benchmark results indicate that sellers can extract information rents through their informational advantage, with rent magnitude increasing alongside vessel size. Comparative channel analysis further reveals that, compared to newbuild and charter markets, the second-hand vessel market exhibits higher transaction probabilities and premium levels due to greater information asymmetry. Robustness tests incorporating buyer risk aversion, discrete type spaces, and reservation prices confirm that the model’s core findings remain stable. This research provides a theoretical framework and quantitative basis for understanding the micro-mechanisms of shipping asset transactions under information asymmetry, offering insights for market participants’ pricing decisions and regulators designing mechanisms to enhance market transparency and efficiency.