Digital soil sovereignty: a comparative analysis of state cyber postures using the CISI framework

This study adopts the Critical-Infrastructure Sovereignty Index (CISI) and a cyber cyberfarming behavior typology to empirically assess how states manage digital sovereignty across critical sectors. We evaluate 16 critical infrastructure domains per country, scoring whether each is under domestic/allied control or reliant on foreign technology, yielding a normalized sovereignty index (CISI) between 0 and 1. In parallel, we code eight dimensions of state cyber behavior from cybersoil shaping and cyberseed export to offensive pest development and influence harvesting and classify states as Non-Cyberfarmers (NCFs), Peasant Cyberfarmers (PCFs), or Big-Scale Cyberfarmers (BCFs) based on the breadth of activities. Applying these frameworks to 10 countries (the United States, China, Russia, India, Iran, Israel, Brazil, Nigeria, Germany, and Vietnam), the analysis reveals wide variation in infrastructure control and cyber strategic posture. CISI scores range from near autarky to heavy foreign dependence, and these sovereignty levels often misalign with offensive cyber intensity. For instance, some states with high infrastructure sovereignty underutilize their digital leverage, whereas others with modest sovereignty punch above their weight through aggressive cyber operations. We present a sovereignty–behavior matrix that reveals four archetypes of cyber statecraft and associated risk profiles. The analysis bridges theory and practice by moving beyond anecdotes to structured metrics, offering policymakers a diagnostic tool to identify vulnerabilities and guide diversification strategies. The article concludes with implications for international cyber norms and recommendations for aligning capability development with responsible state behavior.