Alliance bundling, relative technological capability, and semiconductor governance modes: explaining U.S. technology governance toward Japan and China

Since the 1980s, the United States has repeatedly used semiconductor policy as a core instrument of technology governance. Existing studies have often explained these strategies in terms of technological rivalry or security concerns, but have paid less attention to how alliance bundling and relative technological capability jointly shape the choice of governance mode. This article argues that U.S. semiconductor governance is structured by two independent variables: alliance bundling and the target country’s relative technological capability. Building on these two dimensions, the study develops a four-type typological framework: embedded governance, directive governance, lock-in governance, and coopetitive governance. A comparative analysis of U.S. policies toward Japan and China shows that strong alliance bundling enables the United States to exercise institutional authority and embed non-neutral rules within allied industrial structures, as in the Japanese case. By contrast, the absence of alliance bundling with China limits U.S. political authority and pushes governance toward lock-in governance, relying on chokepoint control, export restrictions, and cross-border coordination to constrain technological upgrading. From a network statecraft perspective, these governance modes are not merely trade or security instruments; they are also mechanisms through which the United States projects power across semiconductors as critical digital infrastructure. In this sense, semiconductor governance directly affects the industrial resilience of the global semiconductor innovation-production system. The article contributes to the literature on technology governance by showing how alliance structures mediate governance modes and their implications for industrial resilience in strategic sectors.