Countering demand disruptions: the role of resilience investment and contract design in food supply chains

To address the impact of demand disruption risks on dual-channel food supply chains, this paper constructs a two-echelon supply chain Stackelberg game model comprising a single supplier and a single retailer. Treating the supply chain resilience investment level as an endogenous decision variable, it systematically analyzes its effects on system profit and channel coordination under four scenarios: decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, cost-sharing contract (CS), and a composite contract combining cost-sharing and revenue-sharing (CRS). The research results show that although resilience investment entails upfront costs, it effectively enhances the probability of the supply chain maintaining normal operations during disruptions, thereby significantly increasing overall profit. Among these contractual mechanisms, the CRS contract, through its dual incentive approach of “cost-sharing + revenue-sharing,” demonstrates the optimal coordination effect in promoting upstream and downstream collaborative investment and alleviating the “double marginalization” problem. Further numerical simulation analysis indicates that the resilience investment efficiency coefficient (λ) has a positive impact on profit levels and resilience investment intensity. In contrast, the impact coefficient of resilience investment on market demand (η) exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with profit, pricing, and investment level. This study provides a theoretical basis for food enterprises to scientifically formulate resilience investment strategies and design contractual mechanisms to achieve risk resistance and system synergy in the context of demand disruptions.