Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited
Abstract
We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX0—i.e., envy-freeness up to any item, where EFX restricts attention to positively valued items and EFX0 allows removing zero-valued items as well—can conflict with Pareto-optimality (PO), maximin (MM), or maximum Nash welfare (MNW). Normatively, we argue that envy-freeness (even as EFX or EFX0) is not a panacea for allocating indivisible items and should be weighed against efficiency and welfare criteria.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Optimization and Search Problems
Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Games
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 4–4
- Publication date
- 14 January 2026
- Language
- EN