Happiness in the AI Age: Ricoeur and the Question of the AI Humanoid as the Technological Other

In this paper, we examine the evolving conception of the “other” in relation to human happiness, drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical account and empirical findings from the Harvard Study of Adult Development. Ricoeur situates happiness in three interrelated threads: individual fulfilment, friendship with those near to us, and just relations with distant others. The Harvard Study corroborates the significance of relationality for well-being, showing that strong social ties enhance longevity and life satisfaction. However, contemporary digitalisation and the proliferation of AI humanoid social robots challenge traditional notions of the “other.” Individuals increasingly form “meaningful” attachments, emotional bonds, and even romantic relationships with technological artefacts, raising the question of whether these non-human entities can contribute to happiness in a Ricoeurian sense. While the above dynamics are now proliferating, we argue that AI and social robots cannot be considered as the “other” in the Ricoeurian sense. Although these technologies can be considered as a virtual other, we do not defend that position in the current paper. In this paper, we explore the tensions regarding the authenticity, moral status, and ethical implications of AI and social robots in relation to human happiness. We conclude by proposing a re-evaluation of relationality, moral consideration, and the ethical frameworks underpinning human–technology interactions in the pursuit of human flourishing and happiness in the Ricoeurian sense.