Contract Design for Coordinating Fresh Produce E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Information Asymmetry

Information asymmetry regarding freshness has become a critical issue in the fresh produce supply chain. This study focuses on a fresh produce e-commerce supply chain comprising suppliers, third-party logistics (TPL) providers, and e-commerce platforms. Considering consumer preferences for freshness, it employs a Stackelberg game model to examine the impact of TPL exaggerating freshness preservation efforts on the supply chain. Subsequently, contract design is employed to achieve supply chain coordination. Findings indicate that when TPL misrepresents preservation effort information, profits decline across all supply chain members. A cost-sharing-profit-sharing contract facilitates redistribution of costs and benefits between upstream and downstream entities, thereby increasing preservation effort levels. Although preservation costs increase under this arrangement, contractual terms ultimately enhance profits for all supply chain members. This study incorporates freshness preferences to enhance model realism, providing theoretical foundations for decision-making under information asymmetry regarding freshness preservation efforts. It holds significant practical value for fostering collaboration among members in fresh produce e-commerce supply chains and promoting sustainable supply chain development.