Property-Rights Registration, Transaction Costs, and Realization of Eco-Product Value: Evidence from the Evolutionary Game in Yunhe Terrace National Wetland Park

Property-rights confirmation and registration are widely regarded as an institutional foundation for ecological-product value realization, yet the dynamic mechanism through which registration clarity affects multi-actor cooperation remains insufficiently understood. Using the Yunhe Terraced Fields National Wetland Park in Zhejiang Province as a case, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary-game model involving the local government, farmers, and tourism enterprises. The model incorporates registration clarity into the payoff structure through transaction-cost reduction, compensation realization, and regulatory constraint channels. Parameters are calibrated using gross ecosystem product (GEP) accounting, policy documents, administrative records, and field survey data. Numerical simulations show that clearer registration expands the basin of attraction of cooperative equilibrium and accelerates convergence under the calibrated parameter setting. Government incentives serve as an important external trigger, enterprise participation depends on a feasible balance between cost-sharing and expected returns, and farmers’ ecological protection is crucial for maintaining long-term cooperative stability. The study contributes by transforming registration clarity from a descriptive institutional background into a scenario-based institutional-intensity variable within an evolutionary-game framework. The findings should be interpreted as calibrated simulation evidence rather than direct causal estimates, and they suggest an integrated institutional path linking registration, compensation, transaction-cost reduction, and regulation.