Evolution of Driver Strategies Under Platform-Led Incentives: A Stackelberg–Evolutionary Game Model with Large-Scale Ride-Hailing Data

Online ride-hailing platforms increasingly rely on differentiated incentive mechanisms to regulate driver participation and balance supply and demand. However, drivers’ adaptive responses to such incentives introduce dynamic feedback and uncertainty that static equilibrium models fail to capture. This study develops a dual-layer Stackelberg–evolutionary game framework in which the platform acts as a strategic leader setting the order allocation rates and prices, while heterogeneous drivers adapt their working-hour strategies through evolutionary dynamics. Using operational data from Ningbo, China, we calibrated the demand elasticity and driver cost parameters and identified endogenous fatigue-cost thresholds that govern regime shifts in strategy dominance. Simulation results show that uniform incentives tend to drive the system toward single-strategy lock-in, whereas differentiated order allocation and pricing effectively sustain multi-strategy coexistence and mitigate extreme supply polarization. The findings reveal how platform-led differentiation reshapes the evolutionary fitness landscape of drivers, providing actionable guidance for incentive design aimed at stabilizing supply structures, improving platform revenue, and protecting driver welfare.