The Systemic Impact of Dynamic Regulations on Green Technology Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Incorporating Consumer Preferences

Traditional static policy frameworks struggle to effectively respond to dynamic changes in enterprise behavior, thereby undermining the sustainability of policy constraints; therefore, promoting enterprise green technology innovation (GTI) requires adaptive governance, while consumer green preferences play a non-negligible role in this process. This study constructs an evolutionary game model to examine the strategic interactions between governments and enterprises under a dynamic subsidy and penalty mechanism, incorporating consumer green preferences into the analysis. The results show that static subsidy and penalty mechanisms are insufficient to sustain incentives for enterprise GTI; in contrast, dynamic subsidy and penalty mechanisms are more effective in promoting enterprise GTI. Further analysis reveals that the mechanism combining dynamic subsidies and static penalties exhibits superior governance effectiveness, with a “low-subsidy, high-penalty” strategy combination demonstrating a stronger incentive effect in promoting enterprise GTI. Consumer green preferences significantly influence the strategic choices of both governments and enterprises, and their enhancement drives enterprises to engage in GTI. Overall, promoting GTI requires a shift from rigid static policies to adaptive governance, with full considerations on the impact of consumer green preferences on stakeholder behavior.