Libertarianism and the Paradox of Blackmail

In the present article, we criticize a skeptical solution to the “paradox of blackmail” offered by libertarianism. For such libertarians as Rothbard and Block, there is no real paradox of blackmail, because blackmail is legitimate, or should be legal, and so it is not the case that two legal whites make a legal black. We contend that the libertarian theory of coercion which supports this libertarian skepticism of the paradox of blackmail is problematic and that it unduly monopolizes the discussion of blackmail. As we argue in Dominiak (2024), there is an alternative approach to the question of blackmail according to which blackmail, or at least some instances thereof, can be viewed as fraud rather than coercion. Accordingly, we submit, against libertarian skepticism, that the paradox of blackmail is a real libertarian paradox which, instead of a skeptical dissolution, merits a straight solution. Such a solution, however, should not be looked for in the libertarian theory of coercion but should be based on the libertarian theory of deception and fraud.