Cooperação internacional Brasil-Argentina

The objective of this article is to analyze the paradox between the operational success of the São Borja/Santo Tomé Unified Border Center and the regulatory inertia of MERCOSUR in International Regulatory Cooperation (IRC). The study seeks to characterize IRC mechanisms by identifying the role of intergovernmental institutional structure, to examine the UBC as an exemplary case of bilateral border cooperation, and to explain the paradox through MERCOSUR's decision-making logic. The analysis demonstrates that MERCOSUR's institutional structure constitutes a structural obstacle to comprehensive regulatory convergence while allowing specific successes in operational cooperation. The methodology employs an analytical-descriptive approach grounded in International Regulatory Cooperation and institutionalism, conducting documentary analysis of bilateral agreements, MERCOSUR norms, technical regulations and specialized literature. The investigation demonstrates that operational cooperation can be enabled through agreements executable by administrative actions, while regulatory convergence requires legislative harmonization subordinated to convoluted and fragmented political processes. It is concluded that the intergovernmental institutional model delay and paralyze comprehensive normative harmonization, limits the maximization of intraregional commercial gains and undermines MERCOSUR's competitive insertion in international trade.