Kant’s two formulas of universal law and the relationship between right and morals in the Metaphysics of Morals

This paper addresses the difference between Kant’s two formulas of universal law in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). The main argument is that the principle is formulated, in the last text, essentially as a principle of adjudication which is fully compatible with both internal and external lawgiving of ethical and juridical laws respectively. Given this new formulation, the principle is relieved from the strongly motivational content which characterizes it in the Groundwork, thus providing, alongside the conceptual framework developed in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, the textual basis needed for a better understanding of the moral grounds of obligation and duty in the realm of right according to Kantian thought.