CEO Labor Market Efficiency and ESG Management

Drawing on agency theory, corporate governance research has primarily focused on verifying the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms including CEO compensation and board of directors. The importance of external control mechanisms such as CEO labor market has been largely overlooked. This study examines the effect of CEO labor market efficiency on ESG management. Specifically, we argue that CEOs in a more efficient CEO labor market will lower the level of ESG management since they are under greater pressure to improve financial performance. Using KRESG(Korea ESG Research Institute)’s ESG data of all companies listed on the KOSPI from 2017 to 2019, we found support for our theory. We also found that outside director ratio, foreign ownership ratio, and firm visibility which increase social pressure for ESG management weaken the negative association between CEO labor market efficiency and ESG management. This study offers a new perspective on corporate governance research in Korea by demonstrating the important role of CEO labor market. It also suggests that understanding ESG management requires a more comprehensive approach that integrates various perspectives.