¿Es la epistemología de virtudes fiabilista una teoría meritocrática?

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Authors: Jesús Navarro, Juanma Poyatos
Cited by: 0
References: 32

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Abstract

We argue that the epistemology of reliable virtues, in its current state, assumes a meritocratic logic, in accordance with a social model that links justice to the recognition of the merits demonstrated by citizens. This model has been rightly criticized for masking deep structural inequalities, ignoring the conditions that allow individuals to develop and manifest the successes we attribute to them, and promoting an individualistic, competitive, and unsupportive model of society. But we also maintain that reliability can resist this tendency if it recognizes, first, the social nature of epistemic achievements; second, that the epistemic goalto be assessed in terms of reliability is public and shared knowledge; and, third, that it is necessary to develop critical conceptions of epistemic luck and risk.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Publication details

Journal / source
Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía
Volume
53
Pages
204–230
Publication date
23 March 2026
Language
ES