Abiertos a lo externo: enactivismo, conocimiento no proposicional y epistemología de virtudes

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Authors: Alejandro García Escudero
Cited by: 0
References: 9

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Abstract

In contemporary epistemology, the balance of the classic debate between epistemic internalism and externalism tilts more heavily toward the externalist side, due to the strength of positions such as virtue epistemology, which offers sufficiently clear criteria of epistemic normativity to determine what constitutes knowledge and what counts as justification. However, virtue epistemology—along with other positions concerning knowledge and justification, including internalist ones—is grounded on a presupposition that, if questioned, destabilizes the traditional concept of justification. For this reason, this paper challenges the central role of propositional representation that the epistemological tradition has established as a foundational pillar of knowledge, as well as the figure of the closed epistemic agent that this view presupposes, from an enactivist standpoint that rethinks the concept of justification. Therefore, the aim will be to contribute to virtue epistemology through a shift in perspective, which recovers non-propositional knowledge as a critique of representationalism.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Embodied and Extended Cognition Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía
Volume
53
Pages
79–104
Publication date
23 March 2026
Language
EN