Do Interlocking Directors Contribute to Exploration? A Resource Dependence Perspective
Abstract
Interlocking directors are crucial in driving firm innovation. However, despite existing research on the effect of their presence on boards, we know relatively little about how such directors help the firms decide on specific innovation projects to invest in. We examine the relationship between the presence of interlocking directors on the board and the firm’s tendency to take up exploratory innovation projects, as viewed from the lens of resource dependence theory. We suggest that interlocking directors and the firm’s investment decisions in exploration projects are positively related. We extend research on corporate governance and innovation literature by analyzing the link between interlocks and exploration.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Complex Systems and Decision Making
Capital Investment and Risk Analysis
Publication details
- Journal / source
- American Business Review
- Publisher
- University of New Haven - College of Business
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 264–264
- Publication date
- 1 May 2026
- Language
- EN