Sponsored Search and Product Market Concentration

Read full text Summarise with VIRAT
Authors: Akhil Ilango
Cited by: 0

Summary

No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.

Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.

Abstract

This paper examines how sponsored search auctions shape product market competition. I develop a model in which firms bid for prominence on a platform and set prices, under a cost-per-click commission model. Consumers observe prices before search but incur costs to learn match values. The analysis reveals a novel mechanism: ad commissions pass through asymmetrically to prices. For the prominent firm, commissions function like a fixed cost, leaving its price largely unaffected; for the non-prominent firm, they act as a marginal cost, raising its price. This asymmetry reduces competition and can even reverse price rankings. I explore alternative commission models and provide suggestive empirical evidence consistent with the theory. The paper also provides suggestive empirical evidence from a US digital platform consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Auction Theory and Applications Digital Platforms and Economics Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing

Publication details

Journal / source
ICPSR Data Holdings
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Dataset