Introduction
Abstract
The article focuses on the attribution of moral status to autonomous social robots. After introducing various metaethical positions relevant to understanding what moral status is, it presents the main strategies of those who defend and oppose the qualification of robots as moral subjects, before opting for relationalism. However, relationalism is challenged by the simulated nature of human-robot interactions and relationships. The paper then proposes a solution based on Dennett’s anti-realism about intentionality, which leads to a non-objectivist relationalism that is potentially inclusive of many non-humans, including certain robots.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Literary and Philosophical Studies
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Revue de littérature comparée
- Volume
- nº 395
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 259–261
- Publication date
- 13 February 2026
- Language
- FR