CEO power and bank risk-taking: A revisit in an emerging market context
Abstract
This study examines the impact of chief executive officers' (CEOs)' power on banks' risk-taking for publicly listed commercial banks in Vietnam from 2011 to 2021. Using generalized least square (GLS) random effect (RE) estimation, this study finds that the presence of powerful CEOs, with a large share of ownership and a role as the chairperson of the bank boards, reduce banks' risk-taking. Regarding other bank governance factors, a larger bank board results in lower bank risk-taking, while board independence, in contrast, is positively associated with bank risk. These results are robust to different proxies for banks' risk-taking and different estimation techniques.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Corporate Finance and Governance
Banking stability
regulation
efficiency
Italy: Economic History and Contemporary Issues
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Quantitative Finance and Economics
- Publisher
- American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS)
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1–26
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026