Conflicting Intuitions
Abstract
Research on intuitions about philosophical thought experiments shows a striking pattern. Often, there are powerful intuitions on one side and also powerful intuitions on the exact opposite side. A question now arises about how to understand this pattern. One possible view would be that it is primarily a matter of different people having different intuitions. I present evidence for the view that this is not the correct understanding. Instead, I suggest, it is primarily a matter of individual people having conflicting intuitions. That is, it is primarily a matter of individual people having an intuition on one side and also having an intuition on the opposite side.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- University of Michigan Library
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 0
- Publication date
- 2 March 2026
- Language
- EN