Why Do We Think Pain Is Bad? Comparing the Evaluative Acquaintance and the Evolutionary Account

Read full text Summarise with VIRAT
Authors: 大河 篠崎
Cited by: 0
References: 27

Summary

No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.

Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.

Abstract

This paper explores the origins of the “pain value intuition,” which claims that conscious pain is intrinsically bad. In previous studies, the “evaluative acquaintance account” is dominant, explaining that we have this intuition because we know the badness of pain directly through acquaintance. However, I propose the “evolutionary account,” which explains that we have this intuition because it enhanced our ancestors’ fitness, regardless of pain’s intrinsic badness; I argue that the evolutionary account should be the default explanation. This challenges many theories, including cognitivist hedonism, that rely on the evaluative acquaintance account to explain the value of conscious experiences.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics Aesthetics and Art

Publication details

Journal / source
Kagaku tetsugaku
Volume
58
Issue
2
Pages
77–77
Publication date
30 March 2026
Language
EN