Scientific Naturalism II
Abstract
The Cornell Realists, and Boyd in particular, have a certain take on how the epistemology of science works, on how the special sciences relate to one another, and on how reference to scientific properties and kinds is secured. The package is well-suited to explain how the Paradox of Analysis and the Open Question Argument get off the ground, as a way of defanging them as obstacles to reduction. But it isn't the only such package. An alternative picture, drawing inspiration from the work on scientific terms by David Lewis, aims to vindicate philosophical analyses as a fruitful philosophical and scientific tool, while giving the Open Question Argument and the Paradox of Analysis their due. The approach, sometimes called “ Canberra Plan Reductionism,” is associated most closely with Frank Jackson and Phillip Pettit, each of whom spent a good deal of time at the Australian National University in Canberra.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Philosophy and History of Science
Epistemology
Ethics
and Metaphysics
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Routledge eBooks
- Pages
- 260–277
- Publication date
- 6 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Book chapter